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THE OPENING AND CLOSING
OF MUNICIPAL STREETS IN TENNESSEE 
AND SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES
AND PATCHES IN BETWEEN
Sidney D. Hemsley, Legal Consultant
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few municipal functions touch as many people, 
involve as much expense, and generate as much 
public concern and controversy as municipal streets. 
But the law governing how municipal streets are 
created and closed, and a multitude of other issues 
that arise over the use of those streets, is not 
generally well known by many public officials and 
citizens. For that reason, this publication analyzes 
the law governing a number of questions that apply 
to municipal streets in Tennessee, including 
• What are municipal streets?
• What are the ways municipal streets are created?
• Is a municipal street that has been platted but 
never constructed still a street?
• What does a municipality “own” when a street  
is created?
• What is the difference between a municipality’s 
governmental powers and its proprietary powers 
over its streets, and why does it matter? 
• Are municipalities liable for their dangerous and 
defective streets? 
• What right do utilities have to put their pipes, 
wire, and other utility infrastructure in the 
streets, and what happens to such rights when 
streets are closed?
• Are utilities required to obtain a franchise from 
the municipality as a condition of their use of 
municipal streets? 
• Under what conditions can utilities be made to 
remove their facilities from municipal streets and 
who pays for the utility relocation? 
• How is the width of municipal streets 
determined?
• How do municipalities close streets?
• How much discretion do municipalities have  
in closing streets?
• Must municipalities give notice to other 
governmental agencies or property owners  
that they intend to close a street? 
• Who owns municipal streets after they  
are closed? 
• What right do abutting and other property 
owners have to use closed streets?
This publication is designed for use by both 
attorneys and “laymen.” To that end, it has been 
kept as simple as possible without neglecting 
important legal principles on the subject. Cases 
supporting legal principles in the publication are, 
with a few obvious exceptions, cited in full each 
time they appear. 
II. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
 OF STREETS 
The words “streets,” “roads,” and “highways” are 
often used interchangeably in conversation, and 
even in some statutes and various legal treatises 
on streets. In addition, those individual terms may 
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vary from statute to statute and overlap in some. 
Probably the most accurate description of the 
word “street” is found in Tennessee Code Annotated 
(T.C.A.) § 54-4-201, which establishes the state 
street aid program: 
(3) “street” includes streets, highways, 
avenues, boulevards, publicly owned rights-
of-way, bridges, tunnels, public parking  
areas or other public ways dedicated to 
public use and maintained for general  
public travel lying within a municipality’s 
corporate boundaries…
For the purpose of municipal planning regulations 
under T.C.A. Title 13, Chapter 3, a “Street” or 
“streets” means and includes streets, avenues, 
boulevards, roads, lanes, alleys, and other ways 
[T.C.A. § 13-4-301(3)].
 
T.C.A. § 55-8-101 contains the “Rules of the Road” 
for the operation of motor vehicles in Tennessee, 
and defines both “street” and “highway” as “the 
entire width between boundary lines of every way 
when any part thereof is open to the use of the 
public for purposes of vehicular traffic.” [subsections 
(22) and (61)] In addition, it defines “sidewalk” as 
“that portion of a street between the curb lines, 
or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent 
property lines, intended for use of pedestrians.”
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, 
provides that 
(a) Immunity from suit of a governmental 
entity is removed for any injury caused by  
a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition 
of any street, alley, sidewalk or highway, 
owned and controlled by such governmental 
entity. “Street” or “highway” includes traffic 
control devices [T.C.A. § 29-20-203]. 
T.C.A. Title 1, Chapter 3, contains rules of statutory 
construction for words for the application of the 
Code. The word “street” is not defined therein, but 
T.C.A. §1-3-105, provides the following: “As used in 
this code, unless the context otherwise requires” 
(11) “Highway” includes public bridges and 
may be held equivalent to the words “county 
way,” “county road” or “state road.”
(27) “Road” includes public bridges and may 
be held equivalent to the words “county 
way,” “county road” or “state road.”
III. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL STREETS 
BROAD MUNICIPAL DISCRETION
Generally, property owners have little legal voice  
in the location, establishment, construction,  
and abandonment of city streets, and the courts  
will not interfere with municipal decisions in  
those areas absent fraud or a clear abuse of 
discretion [Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn.  
App. 674 (1927); Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson 
City, 216 S.W.2d 1 (1948); Swafford v. City of 
Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); 
W. G. Wilkins v. Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans 
Railroad Co., 110 Tenn. 423 (1903); Sweetwater 
Valley Memorial Park v. City of Sweetwater,  
372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash & Carry Lumber 
Company, Inc. v. Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)].
It has also been held that municipalities have the 
discretion as to what forms of public travel are 
permissible within a right-of-way. In Blackburn  
v. Dillon, 225 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1946), the width  
of the right-of-way easement was clearly 40 feet, 
but the city had the discretion within that  
easement to determine what forms of public travel 
were allowed (in this case a sidewalk).
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METHODS OF CREATION
It is said in Henry County v. Summers,  
547 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tenn. App. 1976) that 
Unless a passageway has been created
a public way in some manner known to the 
law, such as by act of the public authorities, 
or the express dedication by the owner, or by 
an implied dedication by means of the use by 
the public and acceptance by them with the 
intention of the owner that the use become 
public, or by adverse user for a period of 20 
years continuously creating a prescriptive 
right, it is not a public way [At 250].
There are apparently six “manners of creation” 
known to the law.  
1. County roads automatically become city 
streets upon the incorporation of the  
city or by annexation of territory into the  
city. [See 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, 
Section 1661; Jordan v. City of Cleveland,  
255 S.W. 377 (1922).] 
2. Streets designated by the state as state 
highways, or constructed by the state or  
any political subdivision of the state, are  
city streets. 
T.C.A. Title 54, Chapter 5, gives the Tennessee 
Department of Transportation the authority to 
construct state highways, including interstate 
highways, through municipalities, or to designate 
existing city streets as part of the state highway 
system. It has the sole discretion over the selection 
of streets that become state highways. [Especially 
see T.C.A. §§ 54-5-201 et seq.] 
In either case, state highways running through 
municipalities are simply municipal streets over 
which state traffic is routed, and the municipality 
retains its police powers over such streets.  
[See Collier v. Baker, 27 S.W.2d 1085 (1930);  
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City,  
216 S.W.2d 1 (1948); Paris v. Paris-Henry County 
Utility District, 340 S.W.2d 885 (1960)]. While  
a county or other political subdivision of the state  
can own easements for various purposes within  
a municipality, any street constructed by a county  
or other political subdivision of the state inside  
a municipality, or any county or other political 
subdivision property inside a municipality  
generally opened to public travel, is a municipal 
street [Callahan v. Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501  
(Tenn. App. 1954), Rutherford County v. 
Murfreesboro, 309 S.W.2d 778 (Tenn. 1957); 
Thompson v. Memphis, 66 S.W. 990 (Tenn. 1934); 
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City,  
216 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1948)].
T.C.A. §§ 54-5-207–54-5-210 provide for the 
acquisition of land by a municipality (at the
expense of the state) for the purpose of the 
development and construction of interstate 
connections. But T.C.A. § 55-5-210 provides that 
even where the municipality fails in that job, 
“nothing in §§ 54-5-207–210 shall be construed
as otherwise changing the character or legal status 
of streets in any way and the distinctions heretofore 
made in this code between streets and highways are 
continued in full force and effect.”
3. Formal dedication and acceptance. This  
method contemplates a formal offer, and  
a public acceptance of, the dedication.  
[See Smith v. Black, 547 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 
App. 1977)]. It is also said in 10A McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, Section 33.30, that one 
of the ways that shows intent to dedicate land 
to public use is “recitals in a deed in which the 
rights of the public are recognized.” For that 
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reason, formal dedication and acceptance of 
streets includes their formal purchase.
A statutory method for the formal dedication and 
acceptance of subdivision streets is found in  
T.C.A. §§13-4-301 et seq. It is provided in  
T.C.A. § 13-4-104 that whenever the planning 
commission has adopted the plan of the 
municipality (or any part thereof)
• “[N]o street…or other public way…” shall be 
constructed or authorized until its location and 
extent have been approved by the planning 
commission; unless
• The governing body of the municipality overrides 
the disapproval of the planning commission by  
a vote of a majority of its entire membership.
 
Likewise, T.C.A. § 13-4-307 provides that once the 
subdivision platting jurisdiction of the municipal 
planning commission attaches, a municipality “shall 
not…accept, lay out, open, improve, grade, pave, or 
light any street, or lay or authorize water mains or 
sewers or connections to be laid in any street within 
the municipality, unless”
• The street has been accepted or opened as  
or has otherwise received the legal status  
of a public street prior to the attachment of  
the planning commission’s subdivisions 
jurisdiction; or, 
• The street corresponds in its location and  
lines with a street shown on a subdivision  
plat approved by the planning commission  
or with a street plat made and adopted by  
the commission; or 
• The municipal governing body locates and 
constructs a street or accepts a street, provided 
that it first submits the ordinance or other 
measure for the location and construction, 
or acceptance of the street, to the planning 
commission for its approval, and if it is 
disapproved by the planning commission, 
receives the vote of a majority of the entire 
membership of the municipal governing body.
4. Implied dedication and acceptance. This 
conduct of the landowner and of the municipality 
is weighed to determine whether a street has 
been dedicated and accepted under this method. 
It is said in Roger v. Sain, 679 S.W.2d 450  
(Tenn. App. 1984), that 
It has long been established that private 
land can be implicitly dedicated to use as 
a public road. [Citation omitted.] When an 
implied dedication is claimed, the focus 
of the inquiry is whether the landowner 
intended to dedicate the land to a public 
use. [Citations omitted.] The proof on the 
issue of intent to dedicate may be inferred 
from surrounding facts and circumstances, 
including the overt acts of the owner [Citation 
omitted] [At 452-53] [Emphasis is mine].
Citing an earlier case that quoted from Elliot on 
Roads and Streets, Section 92, the Court continued
Among the factors which indicate an intent 
to dedicate are the landowner opens  
a road to public travel [Citations omitted.]; 
acquiescence in the use of the road as  
a public road, [Citations omitted.]; and the 
fact that the public has used the road for an 
extended period of time. [Citations omitted.] 
While dedication is not dependent on 
duration of the use, extended use is  
a circumstance tending to show an intent 
to dedicate. [Citations omitted.] Finally, 
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an intent to dedicate is inferable when the 
roadway is repaired and maintained by the 
public [At 453]. 
It was also said in Reeves v. Perkins, 590 S.W.2d 
233, (Tenn. App. 1973) that, “Dedication may arise 
from the failure of the owner to object to user 
by the public. A highway may be established in 
this manner” [At 234-35]. In that case a certain 
landowner erected a fence at both ends of a road. 
The county road commissioner argued that the 
road was a public road. Holding in favor of the 
road commissioner, the court pointed to proof 
from witnesses in the area and county highway 
department commissioners and employees that 
…establishes the road has been in existence 
and used by anyone who wished to use 
it since the 1920s. The use included foot 
travel, horseback, wagon, automobile and 
pick-up trucks. No owner of the property 
ever fenced off either of the two ends of 
the road nor did any previous owner object 
to or restrict the use of the road. A former 
county highway commission and some county 
highway department employees testified 
that the county had graded and ditched the 
road several times since 1939. One witness 
traveled the road in a pick-up truck about 
two or three years prior to the suit. 
The road was used by plaintiff Huber Patty 
while a Star Route mail carrier in 1926 
because it was the better road from Sardis to 
Lexington [At 234-35].
The abutting landowner never objected to the use of 
the road during that period.  
Apparently there may also be a formal dedication 
and an implied acceptance of a street easement.  
The approval and recording of a subdivision plat 
does not constitute acceptance of the subdivision 
streets, but probably does constitute formal 
dedication of the streets. If the city fails to  
formally accept the dedication, its conduct in the  
use of the street may constitute implied acceptance.  
[See Smith v. Black, 547 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. App. 
1977); Hackett v. Smith County, 807 S.W.2d 695 
(Tenn. App. 1990); West Meade Homeowners 
Association v. WPMC, 788 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn.  
App. 1989).]
Some of the acts that indicate implied acceptance 
of the street on the part of the city include 
tolerance of common use by the public, construction 
and maintenance by city and other utilities of 
installations in the street, listing on an official 
street map, use of the street by school buses, law 
enforcement agencies, and absence of the street from 
the tax rolls and special assessments. [See State ex. 
Rel. Matthews v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,  
679 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1984); Hackett v. Smith 
County, 807 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. App. 1990); West 
Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC, Inc.,  
788 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. App. 1989).]
In State ex rel. Matthews v. Metro. Government of 
Nashville, 679 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1984), a bank 
obstructed Printers’ Alley with garbage cans and 
dumpsters, and the owner of an abutting building 
asked for a writ of mandamus requiring the police 
to remove those obstructions, arguing that it was 
a public alley. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld 
the issuance of the writ of mandamus by the trial 
court, reasoning that the alley had been accepted 
by the city. In this case little beyond public use 
and the city’s utility location supported the Court’s 
determination that the alley was a public alley. 
Not surprisingly, there is little direct proof 
of the extent of public use of the alley in 
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the years immediately following the offer of 
dedication in 1881. The alley has been used 
by pedestrians to go between Fourth Avenue 
and Printers’ Alley for many years. The alley 
appears in atlases dated 1889, 1908, and 
1928. Although not specifically labeled as  
a public alley on those atlases, it is shown in 
a manner, which is consistent with its status 
as a public alley. The reasonable inference to 
be drawn from the facts and circumstances 
above is that public use of the alley was 
significant in the early years following 
dedication. That public use constitutes  
a public acceptance of the offer of 
dedication. Our conclusion derives support 
from the proof relating to the use of the 
alley by the public and the treatment of the 
alley by the Metropolitan Government in 
subsequent years. 
Pedestrians have continued to use the 
alley as a walkway. Although many of the 
pedestrians are from the J.C. Bradford 
Building, some are from the Ambrose 
Building and others are not associated with 
either building. Vehicles have made use of 
the alley to make deliveries and to park. 
There is no proof in the record that the 
Metropolitan Government has done any 
maintenance work on the alley. However, 
the proof clearly establishes that in other 
respects the city has treated the alley as 
a public alley. In 1965, the city passed an 
ordinance adopting an “Official Street and 
Alley Acceptance and Maintenance Map” 
which shows the alley as Public Alley No. 17. 
In addition, no taxes have been assessed on 
the property. The Department of Public Works 
gave the Nashville Electric Service permission 
to locate a utility vault underneath the alley 
[At 949].
No specific time limit triggers an implied dedication. 
In Nicely v. Nicely, 232 S.W.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1949), 
an implied dedication arose from five years use, 
along with other circumstances, including road 
grading with public funds. In Payton v. Richardson, 
356 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. App. 1962), the Court 
declared that, “The manner of its use is more 
material than the length of time the use  
has continued” [At 291].
A landowner’s grant to a small number or certain 
class of travelers of a right to use his land as a 
passageway generally will not constitute a grant of 
an implied dedication. It is said in 11A McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, Section 33.32, that
…If the user by the public does not exclude 
the owner’s private rights, such user will 
ordinarily be regarded as merely permissive 
and a mere permissive use of property by 
third persons in connection with a private 
use of the property for the same purposes 
does not usually show an intent to dedicate. 
Thus, an intent to dedicate is not shown by 
the act of the owner of land in establishing 
a private way for his or her own convenience 
or for the convenience of his or her 
customers, even though the way is also used 
by the public generally without objection by 
the owner. Similarly, an intention to dedicate 
will not be inferred from the public’s use 
of railroad company’s land if that use is 
consistent with the public use for which the 
railroad company holds the property. 
 
5. Prescription. A street easement arises by 
prescription when a person, including  
THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF MUNICIPAL STREETS IN TENNESSEE  • MUNICIPAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICE 7
a government, uses another person’s land as  
a street openly and notoriously under a claim of 
right for an uninterrupted period of 20 years.  
It is said in Morgan County v. Goans, 198 S.W. 
69 (Tenn. 1917), that, “Twenty years’ adverse 
possessor will establish a right-of-way either 
in the public or in private persons” [At 69]. 
The claim of right and acceptance of the street 
by the government can be shown by public 
maintenance of the street. [Also see Callahan 
v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1954); Morgan County v. Goans, 138 Tenn. 
381, 198 S.W. 69 (1917); City of Knoxville v. 
Sprankle, 9 Tenn. App. 218 (1928); Lewisburg v. 
Emerson, 5 Tenn. App. 127 (1927).] 
In Morgan County v. Goans, 198 S.W. 69 (1917),  
a road ran from the main Wartburg Road to  
Ms. Goan’s place through Duncan’s land. There 
was evidence to show that the road had been in 
existence since 1884, and had been traveled by 
the public since that time as a matter of right. The 
county had never maintained the road, but its use 
by the public for more than 20 years was sufficient 
to create a prescriptive public right in the road. 
6. The laws of eminent domain, and other 
statutes. Land can be taken for streets under 
various laws of Tennessee that authorize the 
taking of land by public entities by eminent 
domain. [General state eminent domain  
statutes: T.C.A. §§ 29-17-201, 29-17-801;  
public works projects: T.C.A. § 9-21-107;  
streets: T.C.A. §§ 7-31-107–110; controlled 
access highways: T.C.A. § 54-16-104. In 
addition, most municipal private act, general 
law, and home rule charters include a broad 
power of condemnation. With respect to the 
general law charters, see T.C.A. § 6-19-101 
(manager-commission); T.C.A. § 6-2-201  
(mayor-aldermanic); and T.C.A. § 6-33-101 
(modified city manager-council)].
It was held in an unreported case that where 
a municipality chooses to exercise its power of 
eminent domain under its charter, it must follow  
the formal procedures prescribed in the charter  
for the exercise of that power [City of Johnson  
City v. Campbell, 2002 WL 112311 (Tenn. Ct. App.)]. 
T.C.A. § 7-31-101 authorizes municipalities to 
construct streets in annexed areas. 
The Tennessee Department of Transportation, and 
counties and cities, separately or by state-local 
agreements, are authorized to construct industrial 
highways. Counties and cities can apparently 
construct such highways inside, and in some  
cases outside, their boundaries. It is said in  
T.C.A. § 55-5-406(b), that
Notwithstanding § 54-5-406 [which limits 
state participation in the construction of 
industrial highways under the conditions 
set out therein], cities and counties within 
this state may and are hereby authorized 
to use any funds available to them for the 
construction and maintenance of industrial 
highways, roads, and streets within their 
boundaries or within, or adjacent to, or in 
close proximity to any industrial sites or 
parks owned or partially owned by them,  
or lands owned or held by them for industrial 
use, when, in the opinion of a majority  
of the members of the governing body of  
any city or county within this state, the 
same will facilitate industrial development  
or expansion.
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However, under the doctrine that roads built in  
a municipality by the state or its political 
subdivisions are city streets, presumably industrial 
highways built by the state or a county within  
a municipality are also city streets. 
CREATION OF ALLEYS AND SIDEWALKS GOVERNED 
BY SAME LAWS GOVERNING CREATION OF STREETS
An alley is a narrow street, and the establishment  
of public alleys and thoroughfares is governed by 
the same rules that apply to streets. [See Lee v. Seiz, 
13 Tenn. App. 260 (1930); Western Union Telegraph 
Co. v. Dickson, 173 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. App. 1941); 
State ex rel. Matthews v. Metropolitan Government 
of Nashville and Davidson County, 679 S.W.2d 946 
(Tenn. 1984).]
IV. SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES AND
     PATCHES INVOLVING STREETS
MUNICIPALITIES USUALLY DO NOT OWN STREETS 
Municipalities usually do not own their streets in 
the sense of owning the underlying fee. There is a 
presumption that the abutting property owners own 
the underlying fee to the center line of the street, 
and the municipality has only a transportation 
easement or right-of-way across the property for  
the use of public travel. [See Hamilton County v. 
Rape, 47 S.W. 416 (1898); Patton v. Chattanooga, 
65 S.W. 414 (1901).] However, property acquired 
by the state or any of its political subdivisions for 
interstates and controlled access highways must be 
acquired in fee simple [T.C.A. § 54-16-204]. 
MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER OVER STREETS
The power to control streets and highways rests 
primarily in the state, which power the legislature 
can delegate to municipalities. [See City of 
Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.,  
112 S.W.2d 385 (1938).] Generally, a municipality 
must exercise the police power delegated to it 
by the legislature in the manner directed by the 
legislature [Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, 640 
S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)]. 
It has been held that “very broad powers of 
regulation, and wide discretion, in the exercise 
of the police power, are held to be vested in 
municipalities in touching the use of its streets.” 
[See Steil v. City of Chattanooga, 152 S.W.2d 624, 
626 (Tenn. 1941).] It has also been held that the 
courts will not interfere with the exercise of that 
discretionary power except in the case of fraud 
or clear abuse of power. Those police powers also 
extend to state highways running through cities. 
[See Collier v. Baker, 27 S.W.2d 1085 (1930); 
Blackburn v. Dillon, 225 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1949).]
It is also the law generally that where private 
activities near, as well as in, a street right-of-
way pose a hazard to street traffic, a municipality 
can prohibit or regulate that activity. Indeed, the 
police power generally pertains to the right of 
a municipality to impose restrictions on the use 
of private property through reasonable laws and 
ordinances that are necessary to secure the safety, 
health, good order, peace, comfort, protection and 
convenience of the state or a municipality. That 
right is broad and well-established [S & P Enters, 
Inc. v. City of Memphis, 672 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1983); Rivergate Wine & Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Goodlettsville, 647 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1983); Penn-
Dixie Cement Corporation v. Kingsport, 225 S.W.2d 
270 (Tenn. 1949); Miller v. Memphis, 178 S.W.2d 382 
(Tenn. 1944)].
An important distinction is made in City of Paris v. 
Paris-Henry County Public Utility District,  
340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960), between the authority 
a franchise gives a public utility over municipal 
rights-of-way and the authority a municipality has 
under its police powers to control the conditions 
of the exercise of that franchise. [For a detailed 
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discussion on franchises in municipal streets, 
see VI. FRANCHISES TO USE STREETS in this 
publication.] In that case the question was whether 
a utility district could make excavations in the 
city’s streets without complying with the city’s 
ordinance governing such excavations. The city 
had by ordinance 295 granted to the utility district 
a franchise to lay, construct and maintain its gas 
lines under the city’s streets. Following the utility 
district’s failure to restore streets it had excavated 
for that purpose, the City of Paris, by ordinance  
316 required any person making a street excavation 
to obtain a permit and pay a permit fee to the city.
The utility district argued that ordinance 316  
was unconstitutional and an impairment of  
a contract under Article I, § 20, of the Tennessee 
Constitution (“No man’s…property [shall be] taken, 
or applied to public use, without the consent of 
her representative, or without just compensation 
being made thereof.”) The basis of its argument 
was that ordinance 295 provided that utility 
district’s agreement to the contract would be the 
consideration and “in lieu of all other fees, charges 
and licenses which the City might impose for the 
rights and privileges herein granted.” The Court 
rejected the utility district’s argument.
It was true, said the Court, that when the utility 
district accepted the franchise, it became binding 
upon the city, and that the franchise gave the utility 
district the right to use the city’s streets to install 
its pipes, and that the contract right created by 
the franchise could not be revoked or impaired by 
the city. However, continued the Court, the utility 
district’s right was
…subject to regulation by the City, acting 
in its governmental capacity under the police 
power, delegated to it by the State, to 
regulate and control its streets for the  
public health and safety. Such power is  
broad and cannot be limited by contract 
[Citations omitted].
Ordinances 295 and 316 were talking about two 
different fees, declared the Court: 
The fees for permits under ordinance 316, 
however, are not “fees, charges or licenses” 
imposed by the City, for any “rights or 
privileges” granted by ordinance 295. The 
latter class of “fees,” etc., were a matter of 
contract, or rather were forbidden by the 
contract, between Defendant and the City 
acting in its proprietary capacity. Lewis v. 
Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 162 Tenn. 268, 
40 S.W.2d 409. 
But the former class of fees, fees for permits 
under ordinance 316, are exacted by the City, 
acting in its governmental capacity, as an 
incident to its enforcement of police power 
regulation, and were not, and could not be, 
controlled or limited by contract [At 889] 
[Citations omitted] [Emphasis is mine]. 
The Court also held ordinance 316 to be a valid 
police power regulation, reasoning that 
Such right [of the utility district to use 
the city’s streets under the franchise], was 
subject to regulation by the City, acting in its 
governmental capacity under the police power, 
delegated to it by the State, to regulate 
and control its streets for the public health 
and safety. Such power is broad and cannot 
be limited by contract [At 888] [Citations 
omitted] [Emphasis is mine].
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The fee imposed by ordinance 316 was also 
reasonable, declared the Court: “It is not shown that 
these fees will amount to more than the cost  
of enforcing this police regulation. 
‘Mathematical nicety is not exacted in cases where 
a license fee is charged as an incident to the 
enforcement of a police power ordinance’ “  
[At 889] [Citations omitted].
The question of whether a police power regulation 
is reasonable requires a two-prong test: First, the 
regulation must bear some relationship to  
a legitimate interest protectable by the police 
powers; second, the regulation may not be 
unreasonable or oppressive [Rivergate Wine and 
Liquors, Inc., v. City of Goodlettsville, above].
STATUS OF UNOPENED STREETS 
West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC, 
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989), indicates that the formal 
dedication and acceptance of a street may occur 
without the actual construction of a street. There  
a recorded plat showed Cornwall Drive to run 
between two certain lots on WPMC’s property. 
However, the paved portion of Cornwall Drive 
ended in a cul-de-sac that left an intervening 
space between the cul-de-sac and WPMC’s property 
upon which no street had been built, but which 
showed up on the plat as a dedicated right-of-way. 
WPMC wanted to develop its property and to use 
the intervening space as an ingress and egress to 
the development. WPMC argued that the City of 
Nashville had accepted the right-of-way. The City 
of Nashville, itself joined the developer in arguing 
that the city had accepted the right-of-way. The 
Homeowner’s Association argued that the right-of-
way on the plat between the cul-de-sac and WPMC’s 
property had not been accepted by the city or had 
since been abandoned. 
The Court held in favor of WPMC, agreeing that the 
city had accepted the right-of-way in dispute. It 
reiterated the well-settled law that establishment 
of a right-of-way requires both a dedication 
and acceptance. The dedication in this case was 
undisputed; it appeared on the recorded plat.  
A dedication could be formally or informally 
accepted, and in this case the city had at least 
informally accepted it, declared the Court,  
reasoning that 
The evidence of public acceptance in the 
present record is similar to that relied upon 
to find public acceptance in Matthews. The 
disputed portion of Cornwall Drive is included 
on the “Official Street and Alley Acceptance 
and Maintenance Map.” In addition, no taxes 
have been paid on the right-of-way and the 
Nashville Electric Service has erected and 
maintained utility poles within the right-of-
way. In Matthews this evidence was sufficient 
for the court to find public acceptance of an 
offer of dedication and we believe that it is 
sufficient to make the same finding in this 
case [At 366].
There had been no abandonment of the  
right-of-way by the city, concluded the Court, 
because the Nashville Electrical Service used it  
for its utility poles.
Presumably, the same rule applies to rights-of-way 
reflected on county road maps where territory is 
incorporated or annexed by a municipality.
But it does not necessarily follow that the public 
has a right to use a street that has been dedicated 
and accepted but upon which no construction  
of a “street” has actually occurred. The Court in  
West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC,  
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989) pointed out in reply to the 
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homeowner’s association demand for an injunction 
to stop WPMC’s development that the municipal 
planning commission had the sole and exclusive 
power to approve or disapprove subdivision plats for 
real estate developments, and that before a sub-
division could be developed on WPMC’s property, the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission had to approve 
a subdivision plan. No such application had been 
approved or even made. For that reason the demand 
for an injunction was premature. While the Court 
did not mention the disputed part of Cornwall Drive 
in connection with the plat, apparently if that 
part of Cornwall Drive was to be used as a street it 
would have been required to appear on the plat of 
the development. In addition, a municipality has 
the right to determine what kind of public travel is 
permitted on its streets [Blackburn v. Dillon,  
225 S.W.2d 46 (1946)]. 
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY FOR UNSAFE AND 
DEFECTIVE STREETS
Tennessee municipalities are liable under the 
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for  
unsafe and defective streets and highways,  
“owned and controlled” by them, and when the 
particular municipality at issue has constructive or 
actual notice of the condition alleged to constitute 
an unsafe and defective street or highway [T.C.A. 
§ 29-20-203]. [Also see Swafford v. City of 
Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); 
Baker v. Seal, 694 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); 
Bryant v. Jefferson City, 701 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1985); Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d 948 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Johnson v. EMPE, Inc.,  
837 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).] 
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act 
does not define the dimensions of a “street” or 
“highway,” except to say that it includes “traffic 
control devices thereon.” However, a “street” and 
a “highway” within the meaning of Tennessee Code 
Annotated, Title 55, Chapter 8, which contains the 
state law for the rules of the road, are the same: 
“the entire width between the boundaries lines of 
every way when any part thereto is open to the 
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel” 
[T.C.A. §§ 55-8-101(21) and (60)]. Assuming that 
the definition of streets and highways is probably 
the same for the purposes of the Tennessee 
Governmental Tort Liability Act as it is for T.C.A., 
Title 55, Chapter 8, these definitions appear to 
include the entire street right-of-way.
Apparently there is no reported case under the 
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act involving 
damage to a motorist or pedestrian arising from 
a condition on private property entirely outside 
the boundary of the street right-of-way. But 
governments have been held liable for damages 
arising from such conditions in a significant number 
of cases in the United States [3 A.L.R.2d 6;  
98 A.L.R.3d 101; 45 A.L.R.3d 875; 3 A.L.R.4th 770;  
60 A.L.R.4th 1249; 95 A.L.R.3d 778; 100 A.L.R.3d 
510; 54 A.L.R.2d 1195; 52 A.L.R.2d 689;  
57 A.L.R.4th 1217; 19 A.L.R.4th 532]. The same  
is true with respect to pedestrians in Tennessee  
in cases that pre-date the Tennessee Governmental 
Tort Liability Act, but that probably still apply  
to the application of that Act to streets as well  
as sidewalks. 
For example, in City of Knoxville v. Baker, 150 
S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. 1941), the question was whether 
the city was liable for injury to a pedestrian who 
voluntarily stepped off a sidewalk and tripped 
over a steel water cut-off rod projecting 18 inches 
above ground, but located 18 to 21 inches off the 
sidewalk and entirely upon private property. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court held the city not liable 
for the injury on the ground that when he was 
injured, the pedestrian was a voluntary trespasser 
on private property. But in doing so the Court 
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rejected the city’s argument that it was not liable 
because “its duty of keeping the street and sidewalk 
clear of obstructions extended only to the limits of 
the streets ‘as made and used;’ that it was under 
no duty to go upon private premises and remove 
the water cutoff or erect a barrier along the side 
of the walk to prevent persons from straying off 
the sidewalk and into a place of danger.” The rule, 
declared the Court, is 
that if an obstruction or excavation be 
permitted which renders the alley, street, or 
highway unsafe or dangerous to persons or 
vehicles—whether it lie immediately in or 
on the alley, street, or highway, or so near 
it as to produce the danger to the passer at 
any time when he shall properly desire to 
use such highway,—it is such a nuisance as 
renders the corporation liable…[Emphasis is 
mine.]…A party bound to keep a highway in 
repair and open for the passage of the public 
in a city by night or by day, certainly cannot 
be held to perform that duty by simply 
keeping the area of the highway free, while 
along its edge there is a well or excavation 
undisclosed, into which the passer, by an 
inadvertent step or an accidental stumble, 
might fall at any time. [Citing Niblett v. 
Nashville, 59 Tenn. 684, 12 Heisk. 684, 
686-689, 27 Am. Rep. 755.] [At 226-227.] 
[Emphasis is the courts.]
The Court pointed to 25 Am.Jur., p.184,  
Section 531, for support:
As a general rule, the duty of a municipal  
or quasi-municipal corporation or of  
a private individual to guard excavations or 
other dangerous places or hazards and the 
resulting liability for failure to do so exists 
only when such places are substantially 
adjoining the way, or in such close proximity 
thereto as to be dangerous, under ordinary 
circumstances, to travelers thereon who, 
using ordinary care, or, as it is sometimes 
stated, where they are so located that  
a person walking on the highway might, 
by making a false step or movement, or be 
affected with a sudden giddiness, or by other 
accident, come into contact therewith. No 
definite rule can be laid down as to how far 
a dangerous place must be from the highway 
in order to cease to be in close proximity to 
it, but the question is a practical one, to be 
determined with regard to the circumstances 
of the particular case. In the determination 
of the question whether a defect or hazard 
is in such close proximity to the highway 
as to render traveling upon it unsafe, that 
proximity must be considered with reference 
to the highway ‘as traveled and used for the 
public travel,’ rather than as located, and 
the proper test for determining the necessity 
for a barrier or liability for injury, is whether 
the way would be dangerous to a traveler 
so using it rather than the distance from it 
of the dangerous object or place. The mere 
fact that the space adjoining the highway 
is unsafe for travel is not enough to impose 
such liability, and none exists, either on the 
part of the municipality or of the owner of 
the premises, if, in order to reach the danger, 
one must become an intruder or voluntary 
trespasser on the premises of another. The 
fact that the injury occurs on the adjoining 
premises does not necessarily preclude  
a recovery, however where the traveler is 
not a voluntary trespasser. Furthermore, if 
the traveler is forced to leave the highway 
in order to pass around an obstruction 
placed by the landowner, the latter is 
liable for injury resulting from a dangerous 
condition on his premises even though the 
condition was not in such close proximity to 
the highway as to render him liable under 
ordinary circumstances [At 226].
[Also see Niblett v. Mayor of Nashville, 59 Tenn.  
684 (Tenn. 1874); McHargue v. Newcomer & Co.,  
100 S.W. 700 (Tenn. 1906); Chattanooga v. Evatt,  
14 Tenn. App. 474 (1932).] 
As City of Knoxville v. Baker suggests, where  
a motorist suffers damage from an obstruction or an 
excavation entirely outside the street right-of-way, 
the question of the obstruction’s or excavation’s 
distance outside the street right-of-way is  
a practical one; there is no hard, fast rule. In that 
case the plaintiff was injured on private property 
when he voluntarily left a sidewalk of ample width 
and in good condition. However, reason dictates 
that generally, the nearer the excavation or other 
condition to the edge of the right-of-way in 
general, and to the traveled portion of the street 
in particular, the more likely it is that municipal 
liability will be found. 
Many of the cases in which a municipality has  
been found liable for damages arising from  
motorists striking obstructions outside the 
boundaries of the street right-of-way involve dead 
end streets or sharp curves of which motorists were 
not warned as they proceeded along the traveled 
portion of the roadway, and other unusual conditions 
related to the nature and condition of the traveled 
portion of the roadway. [See Chattanooga v. Evatt, 
14 Tenn. App. 474 (1932).] Generally, it appears 
that to recover damages for striking an obstruction 
entirely outside the street right-of-way, the motorist 
must show that a defect or unsafe condition in the 
traveled portion of the street itself caused him to 
strike the obstruction.
V. RIGHT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
    TO USE STREETS
GENERALLY 
It has been held that both public and private 
utilities can use municipal streets to install and 
maintain their infrastructure without the permission 
of, or payment to, the fee owner of the street.  
[See Frazier v. East Tennessee Telephone Co.,  
90 S.W.620 (1900); Johnson v. Chattanooga,  
191 S.W.2d 175 (1945); Pack v. Southern Bell 
Telephone & Telegraph Company, 319 S.W.2d  
90 (1958).] The reason is exemplified in Pack v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, above, in which 
the Court, citing a multitude of cases from both 
Tennessee and other states, said 
Since 1905 under the holding in Frazier v. 
East Tennessee Tel. Co., 115 Tenn. 416,  
90 S.W. 620, 3 L.R.A., N.S, 323, Tennessee 
has been committed to the view that the 
use of public rights-of-way by utilities for 
locating their facilities is a proper highway 
use subject to their principal purpose as 
travel and transportation of persons and 
property…[At 792].
UTILITY RELOCATION
Generally, while public utilities have the right to use 
municipal streets, that right is always subordinate 
to the principal purpose of the streets, which is 
obviously travel. For that reason, where street 
improvements necessitate it, utilities can be made 
to remove their facilities from the public streets. 
Tennessee follows the common law rule that in the 
absence of a statute providing otherwise, public 
utilities must remove their facilities at their own 
expense [Pack v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,  
387 S.W.2d 789 (1965); State v. Southern Bell  
Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W.2d 90 (1958) (cert. denied 
by U.S. Supreme Court, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959));  
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Bristol Tenn. Housing Authority v. Bristol Gas Corp., 
407 S.W.2d 681 (1966); Metropolitan Development 
and Housing Agency v. South Central Bell Telephone 
Co., 562 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. App. 1978)]. 
T.C.A. §§ 54-5-804 et seq. provides for the state’s 
payment of the costs of utility relocation with 
respect to “public highways.” The definition of 
“public highway” within the meaning of that  
statute is a state highway forming part of the 
state highway or interstate system, and includes 
municipal streets that are part of those systems 
[T.C.A. § 54-5-802(5)]. Eligibility for utility 
relocation reimbursement under T.C.A. § 54-5-804 
hinges on the utility’s compliance with  
certain provisions of that statute and of  
T.C.A. § 54-5-854(b), the latter of which generally 
relates to the timely removal of the utility’s 
infrastructure. In addition, reimbursement is 
conditioned upon the costs of that statute being 
funded and appropriated by the General Assembly 
[Public Acts 2003, Chapter 86, §§ 3 and 4].
T.C.A. § 54-22-101, also creates a presumptive 
right-of-way width under certain conditions 
“[w]herever the state proposes to improve a section 
of an existing two (2) lane undivided public road. 
[Emphasis is mine.] In addition, that statute 
provides that the state is responsible for the 
relocation of both above ground and underground 
utilities located entirely within that presumptive 
right of way. However, T.C.A. § 1-3-105 defines the 
terms used in the T.C.A. The word “Road” “includes 
public bridges and may be held equivalent to the 
words ‘county way,’ ‘county road,’ or ‘state road’ 
[Subsection (27)]. For that reason, that statute 
probably does not apply to municipal streets. 
Nothing in the context of T.C.A. § 54-22-101 
indicates that “public road” includes a municipal 
street. Indeed, an unsuccessful attempt was made 
several years ago to amend that statute to add 
municipal streets to its coverage.
VI. FRANCHISES TO USE STREETS
FRANCHISE NECESSARY?
A franchise has been defined as the “grant of  
a right or privilege by the sovereign power usually 
with respect to streets or highways primarily to 
enable the grantee to perform a public service or 
benefit…,” and that, “It is everywhere agreed that 
the right to lay pipes in the public highways is itself 
a franchise” [Johnson City v. Milligan Utility District, 
276 S.W.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1954); Nashville Water Co. v. 
Dunlap, 138 S.W.2d 424 (1940)]. It has also been 
expressly and impliedly held that a public utility 
must obtain a franchise to use a city’s rights of way 
[Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626 (1914); Lewis v. 
Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 40 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. 
1931); Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern 
Cities Power Company; 47 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1932); 
Holston River Electric Co. v. Hydro Electric Corp.,  
64 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1933); City of Chattanooga v. 
Tennessee Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385  
(Tenn. 1938); Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City of  
Nashville, 152 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1941); Patterson v. 
City of Chattanooga, 241 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn. 1951); 
Briley v. Cumberland Water Company, 389 S.W.2d  
278 (Tenn. 1965)]. 
STATE OR MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE?
The power to issue franchises in city streets resides 
in the state. The state can either grant franchises 
directly to public utilities, or it can delegate to its 
municipalities its power to grant franchises to  
public utilities [Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co.,  
40 S.W.2d 409 (1931); City of Chattanooga v. 
Tennessee Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385 (1938); 
City of Memphis v. Postal Tel. Cable Co.,  
145 F. 602 (6th Cir. 1906)]. 
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It is often difficult to determine whether a public 
utility’s franchise has been granted by the state 
or by the municipality. It has been unsuccessfully 
argued by a privately owned utility that its state 
charter operated as a state-granted franchise [City 
of Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Company, 
112 S.W.2d 385 (1938)]. 
Telephone and telegraph companies have extremely 
broad statutory rights to use public rights-of-way  
to install their lines and infrastructure under  
T.C.A. § 65-21-101. In addition, T.C.A. § 65-21-102 
provides that 
Any person or corporation organized for 
the purpose of transmitting intelligence by 
magnetic telegraph or telephone, or other 
system of transmitting intelligence the 
equivalent thereof, which may be invented 
or discovered, may construct, operate and 
maintain telegraph, telephone, or other lines 
necessary for the speedy transmission of 
intelligence, along and over public highways 
and streets of cities and towns…
Those statutes appear to constitute a state-granted 
franchise for such companies to use municipal 
streets for the installation of their communications 
equipment. But City of Memphis v. Postal Telegraph 
Cable Co., 145 F. 602 (6th Cir. 1906), appears to 
hold otherwise. There the Court rejected Postal’s 
argument that various acts under which the city  
was vested with the “entire control” of its streets 
was superseded by Public Acts 1885, Chapter 66, 
Section 1 of which is presently codified as  
T.C.A. §§ 65-21-201–202. Although that act has 
been amended several times, it is substantially  
the same with respect to the broad powers it  
grants to telegraph and telephone companies to  
use municipal rights-of-way. 
But in Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co.,  
40 S.W. 409 (1941), the Court speaks at length  
on “conditional” franchises granted by the state. 
The question there was whether the city could 
charge the gas company a 5 percent franchise fee. 
Yes, answered the Court, under the city’s proprietary 
powers. That was true because even though the 
gas company had a state-granted franchise, that 
franchise was conditioned upon the consent of 
the city, and the city’s consent was subject to 
contractual bargaining between the city and the  
gas company. 
The city was authorized by statute to 
prescribe the terms and conditions upon 
which the gas company might enter and 
establish its business. That, it appears, was 
done through negotiations with the gas 
company, and the obligation, voluntarily 
assumed by it, was not the result of the 
exercise of a governmental power, but of 
contract which both parties could make 
[Citation omitted], and the annual payments 
prescribed by Section 14 of the ordinance 
were compensation to be paid the city for 
the exercise of the franchise, conditionally 
granted by the state, subject to assent of the 
city as the proprietor of its streets… 
[At 412-413] [Citations omitted].
Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern Cities 
Power Company, 47 S.W.2d 86 (1932), suggests 
that where a municipality has in its charter the 
authority to grant franchises in its streets to various 
public utilities, a utility desiring to provide its 
services inside the municipality must obtain the 
municipality’s consent unless the utility can point 
to express statutory authority exempting it from 
obtaining such consent. There the City of Franklin 
had in its charter the power
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…to grant the right of way over streets, 
alleys, avenues, squares, and other public 
places of said town, for the purposes 
of street railroads or other railroads, 
telephones, telegraphs, gas pipes, electric 
lights, and such other purposes as the board 
may deem property; provided that they shall 
not grant the exclusive right…to any person, 
company, or corporation for more than 
twenty years’ and that no general law will 
be construed by implication to repeal this 
special enactment [At 87].
The Utilities Act of 1919 (presently codified at 
T.C.A. §§ 65-4-101 et seq.) gave the Public Service 
Commission [now the Tennessee Regulatory 
Authority] “general supervision and regulation of, 
jurisdiction and control over all public utilities, and 
also over their property, property rights, facilities 
and franchises, so far as may be necessary for the 
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.” 
But the Court rejected the utility’s argument that 
the Utilities Act of 1919 extinguished the city’s 
right to require a utility to obtain a franchise to use 
its streets. It reasoned that the statute giving the 
Public Service Commission power over utilities and 
utility franchises “…nowhere included or conferred 
the power to grant to a public utility the privilege 
of entering upon the territory of a municipality and 
there conducting its business without the consent of 
the municipality” [At 91].1 
Furthermore, in City of Chattanooga v. Tennessee 
Electric Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385 (1938), the state 
granted a charter to an electric company to provide 
electric service in Hamilton County or any village 
therein. However, the City of Chattanooga’s charter 
provided that the city had the authority to
open, alter, widen, extend, establish grade or 
otherwise improve, clean, and keep in repair 
streets, alleys and sidewalks and to have 
the same done “and” to pass all ordinances 
not contrary to the constitution and laws 
of the state that may be necessary to carry 
out the full intent and meaning of this Act 
and to accomplish the purpose of their 
incorporation [At 388].
Those charter provisions, held the Court, compelled 
the electric company to obtain from the City of 
Chattanooga a franchise before it could use the 
city’s streets for its utility services. Indeed, it was 
said in that case that the city’s power to grant 
franchises in its streets need not even be express:
While the charter did not in express terms 
delegate to the city general control over its 
streets and alleys, the powers in reference 
thereto were so numerous and sweeping as 
to be the equivalent of general control. This 
seems to be conceded by counsel for the city, 
for they say in their brief: “The charter of the 
City of Chattanooga, enacted in 1869, gave 
the city general control and supervision of  
its streets. 
 
In the case of American Car and Foundry  
Co. v. Johnson County, 147 Ky. 69, 71,  
143 S.W. 773, 774, quoted with approval by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 
230 U.S. 58, 67, 33 S. Ct. 988, 991,  
____________________
     1The definition of a “public utility” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated, title 65, chapter 4, expressly excludes “any 
county, municipal corporation or other subdivision of the state of Tennessee.” It also excludes a number of other governmentally 
owned utilities, [T.C.A. § 65-5-101 (a)(2)].
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57 L.Ed. 1389, 1394, it appears that the 
county fiscal courts were given, by statute, 
“general charge and supervision of the public 
roads,” etc. Ky. St. Section 4306. Concerning 
the power resulting from the grant by the 
state to control streets or public highways, 
the court said
“The right to grant a franchise presupposes 
and is based upon the right of the authority 
granting the franchise to control the property 
over which is affected by it. For example, 
the fiscal court could grant a franchise 
authorizing the erection of poles along 
the highways of the county, as the fiscal 
court has control of the highways. And so 
municipal corporations may grant franchises 
to use the streets and public ways of a city.”
In Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. 403, 
1 Humph. 403, 34 Am.Dec. 657, it was held 
that a municipal corporation is the proprietor 
of the public streets, which are held in trust 
for the convenience of the citizens, and as 
such proprietor may grade and otherwise 
improve them. Under its charter, the City 
of Chattanooga had the general control and 
supervision of its streets, in trust, for the 
convenience of its citizens [At 388-89].
COUNTIES AND UTILITY DISTRICTS PROVIDING
UTILITY SERVICE IN MUNICIPALITIES
T.C.A. § 5-1-118 gives counties authority to 
establish and operate utility systems, including 
sewer systems, through the device of permitting 
them by resolution to exercise certain powers given 
to municipalities under the general law mayor-
aldermanic charter, including those contained in 
T.C.A. § 6-2-201(3) B(8), (10)B(13), (18), (19), 
(26), and (29). But there is no suggestion in that 
statute that counties can establish sewer systems 
inside municipalities. 
Counties are also authorized under  
T.C.A. §§ 5-16-101 et seq. to establish and  
operate “urban type public facilities,” including 
sewer systems. That authority extends to  
“any area or areas within their border”  
[T.C.A. § 5-16-101(a)]. Notwithstanding that 
language, it does not appear that the county 
has authority to extend sewer service within the 
corporate limits of a municipality without its 
permission. Upon the annexation or incorporation of 
territory, the annexing or incorporating municipality 
has the exclusive authority to provide the urban 
type public facilities in question and to take over 
such facilities. In addition, the county cannot 
extend any urban services type facilities within  
five miles of an existing municipality 
…unless such incorporated city or town has 
failed to take appropriate action to provide  
a specified public service facility or facilities  
in a specified area or areas for a period of  
ninety (90) days after having been 
petitioned to do so by resolution of the 
county legislative body or other governing 
body… (T.C.A. § 5-16-111).
That statute appears to permit the county to 
provide the urban type public facility within five 
miles of the municipality and to its very doorstep 
upon the appropriate petition, but probably cannot 
be read broadly enough to permit the provision of 
such a facility within the corporate limits of the 
municipality without its consent. 
T.C.A. § 7-51-401 provides that 
“(a) Except as provided in § 7-82-302 [the 
Utility District Act] each county, utility 
district, municipality, or other public agency 
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conducting any utility service specifically 
including waterworks, water plants and  
water distribution systems, and sewage 
collection and treatment systems is 
authorized to extend such services beyond 
the boundaries of such county, utility 
district, municipality, or public agency to 
customers desiring such service.”
but that 
(c) No such county, utility district, 
municipality, or public utility agency shall 
extend its services into sections of roads 
or streets already occupied by other public 
agencies rendering the same service, so long 
as other public agency continues to render 
such service.
That statute authorizes the named political 
subdivisions, including counties, to extend their 
utility systems outside their boundaries. It can 
be argued that it implies that those political 
subdivisions have the authority to make such 
extensions into other political subdivisions, provided 
that the streets proposed for use contain no other 
utility lines belonging to another utility and already 
providing the utility service in question. But 
Knoxville v. Park City, 130 Tenn. 626 (1914), and 
Franklin Light & Power Company v. Southern Cities 
Power Company, 47 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1932), require 
that a utility’s authority to extend its service into  
a municipality without that municipality’s consent 
be express authority. It is not enough that the 
statute authorizes the utility to extend its system 
outside its boundaries. 
T.C.A. §§ 7-34-101 et seq. authorizes municipalities, 
including both counties and cities, to construct 
various “public works,” including sewer systems 
[T.C.A. § 7-34-102], but also declares that,  
“[n]o municipality shall construct public works 
wholly or partly within the corporate limits of 
another municipality except with the consent of  
the governing body of such other municipality”  
[T.C.A. § 7-34-105]. 
Municipalities, including counties and cities, are 
also authorized to establish and operate electric 
systems under T.C.A. § 7-52-101 et seq. and to 
transfer to the utility board any sewage works that 
it “now or hereafter” owns and operates. But that 
statute provides that the municipality has the power 
to “[a]cquire, improve, operate and maintain within 
and/or without the corporate or county limits of 
such municipality, and within the corporate limits 
of any other municipality, with the consent of such 
other municipality, an electric plant…”
T.C.A. § 5-1-113 appears to give counties broad 
general authority to enter into “contractual 
relations” with municipalities lying within their 
boundaries, to “conduct, operate or maintain, either 
jointly or otherwise, desirable and necessary services 
or functions.” They also have the power to “contract 
and be contracted with” under T.C.A. § 5-1-118(1). 
T.C.A. §§ 5-16-101 et seq. authorize counties to 
establish and operate urban type public facilities, 
including sewer systems. Section 5-16-109(a) 
gives the board, with the approval of the county 
legislative body, broad authority to enter into 
contracts with municipalities and other governments 
“for the furnishing of services and facilities within 
the purview of this chapter…”
Among the utility laws that give both cities and 
counties the authority to establish and operate 
sewer systems outside their territorial limits,  
T.C.A. §§ 7-34-101 et seq. obliquely permit both 
entities to provide sewer service in the other, by 
consent [T.C.A. § 7-34-105]. It is not clear whether 
the same is true under T.C.A. §§ 7-52-101 et seq. 
That statute specifically applies to electric systems, 
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but cities and counties may also transfer to the 
utility board various utilities, including sewer 
systems [T.C.A. § 7-52-111]. One of the powers of 
such utility boards is the power to extend electric 
service across city and county lines, with the 
consent of the city or county in question. That 
power may not apply to a sewer system operated by 
the utility board.
FRANCHISE FEES; POLICE POWER FEES 
Paris v. Paris-Henry County Utility District,  
340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960), supports the proposi-
tion that municipalities can charge a franchise fee 
for the use of their streets by public utilities, as well 
as certain police power fees, the former of which 
are imposed under a municipality’s proprietary, the 
latter under a municipality’s governmental, powers. 
[For a detailed outline of this case see IV. SELECTED 
LEGAL POTHOLES AND PATCHES INVOLVING 
MUNICIPAL STREETS: MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER 
OVER STREETS in this publication.] An ordinance in 
that case gave the utility district a franchise to use 
the city’s streets for the installation of its gas pipes, 
but did not provide for a franchise fee. The Court 
said that, the “fees, charges, or licenses,” referred 
to in that franchise, “were a matter of contract, 
or rather were forbidden by the contract, between 
Defendant and the City acting in its proprietary 
capacity” [At 889] [Emphasis is mine]. The Court 
cited for support Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating 
Co., 40 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. 1931). 
In Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., Section 14 
of the franchise agreement provided for the payment 
of 5 percent of Nashville Gas & Heating’s revenues 
to the City of Nashville. After concluding that the 
city had authority in its charter to control its streets 
and regulate the granting of franchises, and that 
the statutes giving the Public Service Commission 
the power to regulate utilities did not supersede the 
city’s right to require the utility to obtain  
a franchise to use its streets, the Court discussed  
at length the nature and implications of franchises.
Under the statutes referred to, the gas 
company’s franchise was dependent upon 
approval and consent of the municipal 
government and upon such terms and 
conditions as it might impose. The power 
to assent and impose conditions thus 
recognized by the Legislature carried  
with it the correlative right of the city  
to make terms and impose conditions 
[Citations omitted]. 
The annual payments which the gas company 
agreed to make to induce the city to let it in and 
to use then existing and subsequently extended 
streets were not exacted through the exercise of 
governmental power. The provision of Section 14 
of the ordinance requiring these payments was the 
result of negotiations, culminating in a contract 
between the city acting in its corporate and 
proprietary capacity and the gas company exercising 
its power to contract. 
One of the conditions which a municipal 
corporation can lawfully attach to the grant 
of a franchise is the payment of money; and 
the payment need not be such as imposed 
upon all others similarly situated, as in the 
case of a tax, or the equivalent of the cost 
of inspection and replacement, as in the case 
of a license fee imposed under the police 
power, but may be a definite sum arbitrarily 
selected, and if the company does not wish 
to pay it need not accept the franchise… 
The gas company having voluntarily 
obligated itself, as provided in Section 14 
of Ordinance 155, the continued exaction 
of the payment thereunder violates no right 
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guaranteed by the State or the Federal 
Constitution [At 412-13].
[Also see Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. City  
of Nashville, 152 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1941).] 
The franchise fee-police power fee distinction 
appears again in the unreported case of City  
of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecommunications,  
2000 WL 122199 (Tenn. Ct. App.). There the City  
of Chattanooga adopted an ordinance imposing  
a franchise fee of 5 percent of the gross revenues 
of telecommunications companies using the city’s 
streets. The Court, pointing to Paris v. Paris-Henry 
County Utility District, 340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960), 
and other cases, declared that any fee charged by 
the city must rely upon the city’s governmental 
(police power), rather than its proprietary, powers. 
The Court did not mention T.C.A. § 65-21-103, 
which authorizes municipalities to charge telegraph 
and telephone companies police power “rent,” but 
declared that because two of the parties to the 
case already had a franchise (which apparently 
did not provide for a franchise fee) which were 
not subject to alteration, and because the city 
could not discriminate against the providers of 
telecommunications service, the city could not 
impose franchise fees upon any of the parties. The 
5 percent franchise fee could not survive as a police 
power rent because it bore no relationship to the 
city’s cost of regulating the telecommunications 
provider’s use of the streets. 
CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISES
The Cable Television Act of 1977, found at  
T.C.A. § 7-59-101, expressly declares that 
The governing body of each municipality 
in each county in this state has the power 
and authority to regulate the operation of 
any cable television company which serves 
customers within its territorial limits, by  
the issuance of franchise licenses after  
public notice and showing the terms of  
any proposed franchise agreement and  
public initiation for fees and not inconsistent 
with any rules and regulations of the  
federal communications commission 
[Emphasis is mine].
Cable television providers must also obtain  
a franchise to use municipal streets to provide such 
services [T.C.A. §§ 7-59-101 et seq.; James Cable 
Partners, L.P. v. City of Jamestown, 818 S.W.2d 338 
(Tenn. App. 1991)].
The Cable Television Act of 1977 provides that, 
“A county shall not issue a franchise within any 
municipality” [T.C.A. § 7-59-101(c)]. In addition, 
1999 amendments to that Act provide that even 
electrical systems operating under the Municipal 
Electrical Plant Law of 1935, and that provide cable 
television services, must obtain a franchise “from 
the appropriate municipal governing body or county 
governing body” [T.C.A.§ 7-59-102], and that 
Nothing contained in this section shall be 
interpreted to limit the authority of the 
franchising authority to collect franchise 
fees, control and regulate its streets and 
public ways, or enforce its powers to provide 
for the public health, safety and welfare 
[T.C.A. § 7-59-102(k)].
That Act and its 1999 amendments undoubtedly 
speak of the “municipality” of the “county,” and 
of the “franchising authority,” respectively, as 
an incorporated municipality within a county, as 
the territory in the county excluding incorporated 
municipalities, and as the municipality when  
the cable television service is provided within  
a municipality, and as the county when the cable 
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television service is provided within a county 
outside an incorporated municipality.
LIMITING CHARACTER OF FRANCHISES 
Changing terms of a franchise. Rights vest in  
the franchise holder during the life of the  
franchise. Generally, those rights cannot be  
impaired or revoked by the municipality  
[City of Paris v. Paris-Henry County Public Utility 
District, 340 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1960)]. It is  
further said in City of Chattanooga v. Tennessee 
Electric Power Company, 112 S.W.2d 385  
(Tenn. 1938), citing 12 R.C.L. 213, 214, that 
The grant of a franchise to a public utility 
company is, according to the weight of 
authority, a grant of a property right in 
perpetuity, unless limited in duration by the 
grant itself, or as a consequence of some 
limitation imposed by the general law of 
the state, or by the corporate powers of the 
municipality making the grant. If there be 
authority to make the grant, and it contains 
no limitation or qualification as to duration, 
the plainest principles of justice and right 
demand that it shall not be cut down, in 
the absence of some controlling principle of 
public policy [At 389-90]. 
 
Footnote 3 of James Cable Partners, L.P., v. City of 
Jamestown, 818 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), 
declares that
Once an ordinance which grants a franchise  
is accepted and “all conditions imposed 
instant to the right performed, it ceases 
to be a mere license and becomes a valid 
contract, and constitutes a vested right.”  
12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 34.06. 
This contract once established has the  
same status and effect as any other  
contract enforceable under the law  
[36 Am.Jur.2d Franchises § 6 (1968)].
The contractual nature of franchises severely limits 
the right of municipalities to charge franchise fees 
where there is no record in the initial or subsequent 
line of franchises that provide for such fees. 
REGULATION OF FRANCHISES BY THE TENNESSEE
REGULATORY AUTHORITY (TRA)
T.C.A. Title 65, particularly chapters 4 and 5, give 
the TRA extensive authority to regulate privately 
owed public utilities, and limited authority to 
regulate municipally owned public utilities. 
Tennessee municipal utilities are expressly excluded 
from the definition of “public utilities” for those 
purposes in T.C.A. § 65-4-101(a)(2). But the TRA’s 
regulation of municipal utilities comes through its 
right to regulate the relationship between public 
utilities and municipalities. 
Franchise payments by a public utility for the use of 
municipal streets made after February 24, 1961, are, 
insofar as practicable, to be billed pro rata to the 
public utility’s customers [T.C.A. § 65-4-105(e)].
Franchises granted to any public utility by the state 
or any political subdivision must have the approval 
of the TRA, which must hold a hearing to determine 
whether the franchise is necessary for the public 
convenience [T.C.A. § 65-4-107]. T.C.A. § 65-4-201 
prohibits a public utility from extending services 
to a municipality already being served by another 
utility unless it obtains a certificate of convenience.
A public utility can appeal to the TRA any order or 
regulation made by a municipality, and the TRA can 
resolve such an appeal [T.C.A. § 65-4-109]. 
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VII. DETERMINING THE WIDTH
       OF MUNICIPAL STREETS 
WIDTHS BASED ON PLATS, DEEDS, ETC.
Sometimes the width of street easements can easily 
be ascertained from a plat, deed, or other allied 
documents. That is probably most true of streets 
established by formal dedication and acceptance, by 
formal dedication and implied acceptance, and by 
eminent domain. However, often no such documents 
exist with respect to many street easements, 
particularly in the cases of implied dedication and 
acceptance and of prescription. Such documents as 
can be found in other cases do not usually specify 
the width of the easement. 
 
The heavy weight of authority in the United States 
is that where there is an express grant of a street 
easement that does not specify its width, the width 
is determined by the intention of the parties to 
the grant, and that intention is determined from 
the facts and circumstances, sometimes including 
the use of the easement. Generally, the width 
determined by the courts is what is reasonable, 
convenient, and suitable [28 A.L.R.2d 253]. 
That also appears to be the rule in Tennessee.  
With respect to streets created by formal dedication 
and acceptance, it was said in Town of Benton  
v. Peoples Bank of Polk County, 904 S.W.2d 598 
(Tenn. App. 1995), that “the object in all boundary 
cases is to find, as nearly as may be, certain 
evidence of what particular land was meant to be 
included for conveyance” [At 601]. It was also said 
in Doyle v. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433 (1913), that
The execution of an official map by the city, 
showing the street offered to be dedicated to 
be such, has also been held to be evidence 
of an acceptance. [Citation omitted.] Where 
the dedication is clearly defined, as in this 
case by a registered map, and the public user 
is of the whole, practically speaking, the 
presumption is that an act of acceptance of 
a part thereof is an acceptance of the whole 
[Citations omitted] [At 441].
WIDTHS BASED ON “USER”
With respect to the width of street easements 
acquired by user or prescription, it is said in  
39 Am.Jur.2d Highways, Streets and Bridges,  
Section 63, that 
As a general proposition, the width of  
a highway established solely by prescription 
or user is determined by the extent of such 
use… While there are cases which appear 
to recognize that a highway acquired by 
prescription or user does not extend beyond 
the beaten or traveled path, it is more 
generally held that the public easement 
is not necessarily confined strictly to the 
beaten or traveled path in every instance. In 
some cases the determination of the width 
of a highway acquired by prescription or 
user rests upon whether or not a particular 
width is necessary for the convenience of the 
public… Ditches along the side of a highway 
acquired by prescription or user are generally 
regarded within the boundaries of a highway. 
It is likewise said in 10A McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, Section 39.29, that
The extent of the prescriptive easement, it  
is held, is governed entirely by the extent  
of the user. The boundary of a public  
highway acquired by public use is  
a question of fact to be determined by the 
appropriate finder of fact. This is to say, 
that the extent of a street or alley acquired 
by prescription is generally limited to the 
portion actually used. 
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But 10A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,  
30.22, also says, that 
It has been held that the width of  
a prescriptive easement is not limited to that 
portion of the road actually traveled, and it 
may include the shoulders and the ditches 
that are needed and have actually been used 
to support and maintain the traveled portion. 
76 A.L.R.2d 535 says that the width of street 
easements established by prescription is determined 
by the extent of use. It also appears to conclude 
that generally the width of such easements includes 
not only the traveled portions of the street, but also 
such adjacent land reasonably necessary for public 
travel as determined by the peculiar circumstances 
of the case in question, and such additional land 
as might be needed for repairs and improvements. 
It also points to cases holding that the easement 
includes drainage ditches and waterways. 
Finally, 10A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
Section 30.03 says that, “Street, in a legal sense, 
usually includes all parts of the way—the roadway, 
the gutters and the sidewalks.”
However, it was said in Blackburn v. Dillon,  
225 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1946), that “[t]he term street 
in ordinary legal signification includes all parts of 
the way, roadway, gutters and the sidewalks.” In 
that case the width of the street easement in that 
case was clearly 40 feet, and the only question  
was whether the city had the authority to build  
a sidewalk within that easement as a form of public 
travel, but the proposition that the width of the 
“street” includes the roadway, gutters and sidewalks 
appears to apply to street width in general. 
WIDTHS BASED ON STATUTES
In Ludwick v. Doe, 914 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1996), the Court pointed to the definitions of 
“street” and “highway” in T.C.A. § 55-8-101(60) 
and (21). The definition of both terms is the same: 
“the entire width between boundary lines of every 
way when any part thereof is open to the use of the 
public for purposes of vehicular traffic.” For that 
reason, concluded the Court
It is obvious from these definitions that 
the concept of a ‘street’ or ‘highway’ 
contemplates an area that is wider than 
the part used for the “purposes of vehicular 
traffic.” It should also be noted that neither 
definition is tied to a paved area. We believe 
that when the definitional language is given 
its ‘ordinary and usual meaning’ read in the 
context of the definitions, the conclusion 
is inescapable that the legislature intended 
that the words ‘street’ and ‘highway’ would 
be synonymous with the full right of way. 
Thus a ‘street’ or ‘highway’ as those words are 
used in Tennessee Code Annotated 55-8-118 
[which regulates passing on the right], refers 
to the part designated for vehicular travel by 
the public, any paved shoulder, any unpaved 
shoulder, and any remaining part of the right
of way [Citing State v. Mains, 634 S.W.2d 280, 
282 (Tenn. Cr. App.)] [At 525].
In State v. Mains, 634 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. Cr. App. 
1982), the Court considered the question of whether 
a defendant charged with vehicular homicide arising 
from drunk driving was on the “highway,” when 
the homicide occurred off the paved portion of the 
roadway. The area in question was described by 
witnesses as a
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‘pull-out place’ and was described by one 
officer as being two hundred to three 
hundred feet long and wide enough for two 
or three cars to park side by side. This officer 
also testified the area was part of the ‘state 
highway right of way.’
Pointing to the definition of “highway” in  
T.C.A. § 55-8-101(20) [now (21)], the Court  
declared that, “The word ‘highway’ is defined for 
the purposes of the drunken driving statute as: 
‘The entire width between the boundary lines 
of every way publicly maintained when any part 
thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes 
of vehicular travel.” [Note: the term “publicly 
maintained” was removed from the statute by Public 
Acts 1988, chapter 555.] Then the Court went on to 
determine what that width included. 
The term ‘public highway’ has been described 
by our Supreme Court as ‘such a passageway 
as any and all members of the public have 
an absolute right to use as distinguished 
from a permissive privilege of using same.’ 
[Citations omitted.] Other states have held 
that the “shoulder” of a highway is included 
in the term ‘highway.’ [Citations omitted.] 
Interpreting a legislative definition similar  
to ours cited above, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the statutory 
reference to the ‘entire width’ includes 
everything between the right of way lines  
of the ‘highway’ for statutory purposes  
[At 282]. 
Those definitions included the pull-off, concluded 
the Court.
T.C.A. § 54-5-202, declares with respect to the width 
of state highways in municipalities that
The streets so constructed, reconstructed, 
improved and maintained by the state 
shall be of such width and type as the 
department may think proper, but the width 
so constructed, reconstructed, improved and 
maintained shall not be less than eighteen 
feet (18’); and, in the case of resurfacing and 
maintenance, from curb to curb where curbs 
exist, or the full width of the roadway where 
no curbs exist.
 
VIII. CLOSING MUNICIPAL STREETS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLOSING AND 
ABANDONING STREETS
It is said in 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,  
§ 30.182, that the distinction between abandonment 
of a street, and the closing or vacation of a street is 
that the former is accomplished by inaction, and the 
latter by a prescribed procedure. Some cases suggest 
that a city can abandon a street without the benefit 
of an ordinance. It is said in Wilkins v. Chicago  
St. L. & N.O.R., Co., 75 S.W. 1026 (1903), that
It is also true that the city has the right to 
abandon a street, that is, its easement of 
way, which it holds in trust for the public, or 
for the public interest; and that upon such 
abandonment the fee reverts to the adjoining 
proprietors, if they own to the center of the 
street…[At 465].
[Also see State v. Taylor, 64 S.W. 766 (1901), and 
Knoxville v. Sprankle, 9 Tenn. App. 218 (1928).]  
But none of those cases clearly say that  
a municipality can “abandon” a street by inaction. 
In West Meade Homeowners Association v. WPMC,  
778 S.W.2d 365 (1989), WPMC sought to use  
as an ingress and egress from its development  
a platted street, only a portion of which had been 
constructed, and which ended in a cul-de-sac. The 
homeowners association argued that the city had 
abandoned that portion of the platted street that 
had never been constructed. The court rejected that 
argument, pointing to certain evidence that the city 
had at least impliedly accepted that portion of the 
street. There is no hint in that case of how the  
court would have addressed the homeowners 
association abandonment argument had there  
been no such evidence. 
The Tennessee courts appear to use the words 
“abandon,” “close,” and “vacation,” interchangeably 
with respect to streets. Most municipal charters 
prescribe a procedure for the passage of ordinances. 
There may be rare instances where a charter 
prescribes a special procedure for the passage of 
ordinances closing streets.
 
BROAD MUNICIPAL DISCRETION TO CLOSE STREETS
Generally, property owners have little legal voice  
in the closing of city streets, and the courts will  
not interfere with municipal decisions in those  
areas absent fraud or a clear abuse of discretion 
[Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn. App. 674 (1927); 
Brimer v. Municipality of Jefferson City, 216 S.W.2d 1 
(1948); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d 
174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); W. G. Wilkins v. Chicago, 
St. Louis & New Orleans Railroad Co., 110 Tenn. 423 
(1903); Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City  
of Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash  
& Carry Lumber Company, Inc. v. Olgiati,  
385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)]. 
It is said in Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City 
of Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963), citing other 
cases, that 
Authorities are abundant for the proposition 
that a municipal corporation being the 
state’s representative, may ordinarily vacate, 
discontinue, or abandon its easement in 
a street or part thereof, whenever, by its 
proper board, found, to be unnecessary for 
public use [Citation omitted]. 
The rule appears to enjoy universal 
acceptance in this court as has been 
stated by this Court on numerous occasions 
[Citations omitted].
In the absence of an allegation of fraud or  
a manifest abuse of discretion, courts will 
not inquire into the motives of municipalities 
for vacating a public street [At 169]. 
The Court continued with a citation of 25 Am.Jur., 
Highways, Section 29, page 418:
The question of the necessity for closing  
a street or highway, as distinguished 
from the question of public purpose or 
use, belongs exclusively to the legislative 
department of the government. So, the 
province of the public authorities in whom 
the power to vacate is vested to determine 
when it shall be exercised, and their action 
in this regard will not be reviewed by the 
courts in the absence of fraud or a manifest 
abuse of discretion. The court cannot control 
or revise such discretion on the ground of 
inexpediency, injustice or impropriety…
Ordinarily, the presumption is that a street  
or highway was vacated in the interest of  
the public and that its vacation was 
necessary for public purposes, and the 
burden of showing to the contrary will 
be upon the persons objecting to the 
proceedings [At 169].
The same court built on those principles in  
Cash & Carry Lumber Company, Inc. v. Olgiati,  
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385 S.W.2d 115 (1964), in which the City of 
Chattanooga closed one block of a city street.  
The property upon which the street lay reverted to 
an abutting stove works, which was apparently using 
the street for storage and other purposes. Relying  
on Sweetwater, above, the Court upheld the 
chancellor’s denial of Cash & Carry’s petition for 
an injunction prohibiting the city from closing the 
street. Cash & Carry had not alleged facts sufficient 
to make out a case of fraud. “None of the officials 
here involved have been charged in the bill with 
acts showing falsity, concealment, deceit, or 
perversion of the truth” [At 117-18]. Nor did the 
facts show a manifest abuse of discretion. The fact 
that the property would revert to, and benefit, the 
abutting property owner, did not in and of itself 
show an abuse of discretion or fraud. 
Turning to the issue of inconvenience suffered by 
Cash & Carry in the closing of the street, the Court 
declared that
To reach complainant’s property, it is 
apparent that some convenience will be 
sacrificed. No longer will complainant have  
a direct access for a distance of two blocks 
to Main Street. Instead, travelers will be 
forced to go over one block east or west  
and then down, increasing the distance to 
Main Street at most one block. However, 
there is no allegation that reasonable  
egress and ingress will be destroyed  
[At 118] [Emphasis is mine].
STREETS SHOULD BE CLOSED BY ORDINANCE
In Wilkey v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific 
Railway Company, 340 S.W.2d 256 (1960), the Rhea 
County Chancery Court permanently enjoined the 
railroad and the city from closing a railway crossing 
on a certain street, which was barricaded on both 
ends of the crossing. However, it is clear that the 
case would have gone the other way had the city 
closed the crossing by ordinance. The city had 
passed a resolution to close the crossing upon the 
completion by the state of an underpass several 
blocks away. After the underpass was completed, 
the contractor barricaded the crossing in accordance 
with its contract with the state for the construction 
of the underpass. The city’s resolution and the 
contractor’s barricade was not good enough, 
declared the Court. 
…We cannot agree that the resolution in 
question obviates the need of an ordinance 
closing the crossing on West Second 
Avenue… It may well be, as both the State 
and the Railway company strongly insist, 
that it is necessary to close the crossing on 
West Second Avenue to promote the safety of 
the traveling public. If so, the responsibility 
for closing it remains with the local 
authorities [At 259]. 
In Cash & Carry Lumber Company, the Court 
distinguished Wilkey, explaining why the injunction 
against the closing of the railroad crossing in that 
case was an aberration.
Wilkey [citation omitted], cited by appellants 
for the proposition that no remedy at 
law exists is readily distinguishable and 
is not controlling. In the Wilkey case, the 
municipal government had failed to close 
the grade crossing by ordinance, and the 
Court of Appeals held that there had been 
no exercise of eminent domain, and that no 
damages would be recoverable; therefore, an 
injunction was the proper remedy. 
In the instant case, the proper municipal 
authority has by ordinance abandoned the 
street in question. If complainant’s property 
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has been thereby taken, the remedy is at law 
with an action for compensation [At 118] 
[Citing Sweetwater] [Emphasis is mine].
PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVAL REQUIRED
TO CLOSE STREET 
T.C.A. § 13-4-104 provides that after the planning 
commission has adopted all or a part of the plan  
for the city, 
…the widening, narrowing, relocation, 
vacation, change in the use, acceptance, 
acquisition, sale or lease of any street 
or public way, ground, place, property 
or structure shall be subject to similar 
submission and approval [to the planning 
commission], and the failure to approve 
may be similarly overruled [by the municipal 
governing body].
OTHER PREREQUISITES FOR CLOSING STREETS
Unless a statute or charter provides otherwise,  
no notice need be given property owners of  
a municipality’s intention to close a street 
[Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park, Inc. v.  
Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963)]. There is no 
state law prescribing any special notice or other 
special procedures precedent to the closing of 
municipal streets. T.C.A. § 54-10-201 contains 
notice and other procedures for the closing of 
county roads. Apparently at least one trial court has 
held that those procedures apply to the closing of 
municipal streets. Such a holding is clearly wrong. 
However, because of the potential problems street 
closings can have, municipalities are advised to give 
reasonable and well-publicized notice to abutting 
property owners and other interested citizens 
of their intent to close a street. A municipality 
considering closing a street should also determine 
whether its charter contains provisions governing 
the closing of streets.
IX. SELECTED LEGAL POTHOLES AND
     PATCHES INVOLVING CLOSED STREETS
OWNERSHIP OF CLOSED STREETS
Unless a city owns a fee simple in the land upon 
which the street sits, it has no further legal  
interest in the street following its abandonment. 
In State v. Taylor, 64 S.W. 766 (1901), the City 
of Union City by ordinance and deed conveyed 
one of its streets to a business. In declaring the 
conveyance ultra vires and void, the Court  
declared that
It is obvious under our law, that the 
ordinance and deed in question were 
ineffective to pass any portion of Washington 
Avenue to the intended vendees; first, 
because the corporation did not own the 
fee in the street, and secondly, because the 
easement which it did own was not subject 
to sale and conveyance. The corporation 
had only the right to use this street for 
street purposes. That was the extent of the 
dedication and the board had no authority 
to exceed its limits. The platting of territory 
and sale of the lots by the original owner 
in the manner hereto recited vested the 
city as such, but not otherwise in the 
municipality, and at the same time passed 
to the respective lot purchasers the ultimate 
fee to the soil to the center of the streets 
on which they severally abutted [Citations 
omitted]… So, the corporation had only an 
easement in Washington Avenue, and that, 
from its nature, was incapable of alienation 
and passage to an individual. Hence, to 
repeat what has already been remarked, 
the ordinance and deed relied on by the 
defendant were inoperative as to the fee 
because the corporation did not own it, 
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and as to the easement because it was not 
transferable [At 768].
Even though the conveyance was ultra vires 
and void, its effect “was, nevertheless, in legal 
contemplation, and, in fact, an abandonment of 
its easement in so much of Washington Avenue, 
and though through that abandonment the strip of 
ground in question ceased to be a part of the public 
street, and by operation of law reverted to the owner 
of the ultimate fee” [At 268].
It has been repeatedly said that, municipalities 
usually do not own the fee in land dedicated  
for streets [Hamilton County v. Rape, 47 S.W. 416 
(1898); Georgia v. Chattanooga, 4 Tenn. App. 
674 (1913); State v. Taylor, 74 S.W. 766 (1903)]. 
Generally, they have only easements in their streets, 
and abutting property owners are presumed to own 
the fee to the center line of the street [Hamilton 
County v. Rape, 47 S.W. 416 (1898); Patton v. 
Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (1901)]. It is also said in 
Rogers v. City of Knoxville, 289 S.W.23d 868 (Tenn. 
1955), that “[t]he generally accepted rule is that 
where a right of way is condemned [Emphasis is the 
Court’s] it reverts upon nonuser to the owner of 
the fee…” [At 873]. Smokey Mountain Railroad Co., 
above, did not distinguish between rights-of-way 
taken by eminent domain from other rights-of-way, 
citing Rogers for the proposition that “[w]here  
a right of way is abandoned, it generally reverts 
upon non-user to the owner of the fee” [At 913]. 
[Also see State v. Taylor, 74 S.W. 766 (1903),  
and Wilkins v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R., Co., 
75 S.W. 1026 (1903).] 
EFFECT OF STREET CLOSURE ON ABUTTING 
PROPERTY OWNERS 
The closure or abandonment of a street does not 
affect any private rights abutting landowners 
might have with respect to access to the easement 
[Cartwright v. Bell, 418 S.W.2d 463 (1967); Stokely v. 
Southern Railway, 418 S.W.2d 255 (1967); Knierim v. 
Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806 (1976); Jacoway v. 
Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. App. 1987)]. 
However, it has been held that while a municipality 
has the near unfettered right to close a municipal 
street, the closing may be a compensable taking of 
property [Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park v. City of 
Sweetwater, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Cash & Carry 
Lumber Company v. Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964)]. 
But minor inconvenience accruing to abutting 
property owners upon the closing of a street does 
not necessarily amount to a compensable taking. 
Under Cash & Carry Lumber Company, there had to 
be an allegation that “reasonable egress and ingress 
would be destroyed.” In Sweetwater, it is said that 
It is well settled in this State and elsewhere 
that the destruction or serious impairment of 
a landowner’s right of ingress or egress is  
a taking of property for which compensation 
must be paid. [Citations omitted] Thus, 
if the closing of the northeast end of 
Anderson Street destroys or seriously impairs 
complainant’s right of ingress and egress, it 
may bring an action to recover compensation 
for this taking. See § 23-1423, T.C.A., and 
authorities cited thereunder. Such an action 
normally is known as inverse condemnation. 
[Citation omitted] But the complainant 
cannot enjoin the closing of a street  
[At 170] [Emphasis is mine].
Although the question of the inconvenience of the 
access in Cash & Carry Lumber Company related to 
the city’s discretion in the closing of the street,  
that case suggests that inconvenient access must 
rise to the level of unreasonableness before it 
constitutes a taking.
UTILITIES OCCUPYING CLOSED STREETS
As far as can be determined, there is no statutory or 
case law in Tennessee, and little case law in other 
states, directly on the question whether a utility has 
the right to continue to occupy a street that has 
been vacated or closed. However, Beadle v. Town of 
Crossville, 7 S.W.2d 992 (1928), hints at the answer 
to the question in Tennessee. There the city closed 
First Street for the construction of a standpipe or 
reservoir for its waterworks. 
Beadle argued that when the city closed First Street, 
the land automatically reverted to the abutting 
property owners, of which he was one, and that 
the city had no right to build such a facility on his 
property. The city had a right to close First Street, 
and the right to condemn the property to build 
a standpipe for its waterworks on that location, 
concluded the Court. The only remedy Beadle had, 
continued the Court, was a suit to recover damages 
for the taking of his land.
 
It is difficult to see why the remedy of a property 
owner as to a utility facility already in the ground 
when a street is closed would be any different 
than the remedy of a property owner as to a utility 
facility a city intends to place in the ground after 
the street is closed. In both cases the property 
having automatically reverted to the abutting or 
other actual owners, those owners would be entitled 
to payment for the taking of the land for utility 
purposes, in the latter situation for an inverse 
taking. It was also said in Cash & Carry Lumber Co. v. 
Olgiati, 385 S.W.2d 115 (1964), that
In the instant case, the proper municipality 
has by ordinance abandoned the street in 
question. If complainant’s property has 
thereby been taken, the remedy is at law 
in an action for compensation [Sweetwater 
Valley Mem. Park v. Sweetwater, supra,  
372 S.W.2d at 170] [At 118]. 
That language appears to cover a situation where  
a city closes or vacates a street and leaves any 
utility infrastructure in the ground. 
The law in other jurisdictions supports the theory 
that when a city closes or vacates a street, it 
cannot attach a condition that entitles the utility 
infrastructure to remain in the ground unless the 
city condemns a utility easement. The case of re 
City of Altoona, 388 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1978), held that 
when the city passes an ordinance vacating a street, 
a utility easement in the ordinance was void. The 
Court reasoned that 
When the public right to use Kenyon Road 
was validly terminated by the City of 
Altoona, the property reverted automatically 
and simultaneously to the abutting owners. 
[Citations omitted] The abutting owners are 
entitled to their full reversionary interest 
which the City may not dilute by imposing 
upon the dedication a burden not bargained 
for or contemplated; the dedication of 
Kenyon Road was for the purpose of affording 
the public a right of passage not to benefit 
utility companies or their customers. 
Although an easement for utilities in and 
along Kenyon Road may not have been 
incompatible with its use as a roadway and 
would not have interfered with the rights of 
the owners of the underlying fee, as long as 
the roadway was in use, [citation omitted], 
there is no reason to suppose that the 
easement for utilities would be consistent 
with the purposes for which the land could 
now be used by the abutting owners after 
THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF MUNICIPAL STREETS IN TENNESSEE  • MUNICIPAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICE 29
the cessation of the dedicated use… In 
sum, we hold that when Altoona terminated 
the use for which the land was dedicated, it 
could not at the same time reserve the right 
to an ancillary use not stipulated for in  
the original dedication [Citations omitted] 
[At 316-17]. 
In accord are Gable v. City of Cedar Rapids,  
129 N.W. 737 (Iowa 1911), People ex rel. Greer v.  
City of Chicago, 1154 Ill. App. 578 (Ill. 1910). 
However, a city and a property owner abutting  
a street may be able to contract for the closure of 
a street in which the utility infrastructure would 
remain in the ground without compensation of the 
property owner by the city for the taking of the 
property. In Knoxville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. City  
of Knoxville, 284 S.W.866 (1925), the Court upheld  
a contract under which provided for the city and 
a railroad to share the cost of the construction of 
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a viaduct over the railroad, and the city to close a 
street. The Court noted the provisions in the city’s 
charter authorizing it to open and vacate streets, 
and to enter into contracts, and reasoned that 
The city can certainly make a valid contract 
for the improvement of a street or the  
laying of a sidewalk. With equal certainty  
for a valuable consideration the city council 
could contract for the opening of  
a street when a street would be for a public 
purpose. For a like reason a contract for  
the abolishment of a street or a part thereof 
is valid when the contract is supported  
by valuable consideration and the 
abolishment is for a public purpose  
[At 153 Tenn. 536, 569]. 
The conditions under which such a contract would 
meet the “public purpose” test would undoubtedly 
depend upon all the facts in each case.
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